docs: document directory access grants

AGENTS.md

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ MCP (`runtime/mcp_client.py`): `McpManager` owns one `McpServerConnection` per `
 
 ### Memory (`memory/`)
 
-Async SQLAlchemy + aiosqlite. `MemoryStore`: schema init (+ lightweight SQLite `ALTER` for new columns), default local user, sessions (bound to `workspace` path; optional `provider_name`/`model`), messages stored as msgspec chat message JSON.
+Async SQLAlchemy + aiosqlite. `MemoryStore`: schema init (+ lightweight SQLite `ALTER` for new columns; `PRAGMA user_version` 4), default local user, sessions (bound to `workspace` path; optional `provider_name`/`model`; `todo_stack` + `access_grants` JSON columns), messages stored as msgspec chat message JSON.
 
 ### Agent (`agent/`)
 
@@ -80,13 +80,14 @@ Async SQLAlchemy + aiosqlite. `MemoryStore`: schema init (+ lightweight SQLite `
 - **`/compact`**: soft-compact tool dumps → model summary (no tools) via the same kind dispatch → **new** session seeded with summary message. Soft-compact keeps the last **12** tool results full-size by default (`DEFAULT_RECENT_TOOL_RESULTS`); older tool payloads shrink first.
 - Events: text_delta, **reasoning_delta**, assistant_message, tool_call/result, max_rounds, **error** (`retryable`/`source`), **cancelled** (`reason`), **usage** (`TokenUsage`).
 - Usage: API `usage` from completions (stream with `include_usage`); **char≈token fallback** (~4 chars/token) when omitted; **context size** = last request ``prompt_tokens`` (API preferred); `last_turn_usage` / `session_usage` are **billed sums** (tool rounds re-send history); CLI end-of-turn + `/status`.
-- Config ``[agent]``: `system_prompt` (persona; default `DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT`; `""` omits persona), `tool_directives` (tool playbook; default `DEFAULT_TOOL_DIRECTIVES`; `""` omits playbook; both empty → no system), `mcp_instructions` (fold connected MCP servers' initialize ``instructions`` into the system prompt when tools on; default true), `max_tool_result_chars`, `parallel_tools`, `confirm_destructive`, `path_denylist`, `max_context_tokens` (default 200k est. tokens). Truncated tool results carry a model hint (`[Truncated (N chars max; M omitted). You may ask for user to increase the limit via configuration file.]`) so the model can ask the user to raise `max_tool_result_chars`; request-time compact shrinks (`hint=False`) keep the terse `...[truncated N characters]` marker.
+- Config ``[agent]``: `system_prompt` (persona; default `DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT`; `""` omits persona), `tool_directives` (tool playbook; default `DEFAULT_TOOL_DIRECTIVES`; `""` omits playbook; both empty → no system), `mcp_instructions` (fold connected MCP servers' initialize ``instructions`` into the system prompt when tools on; default true), `allow_paths` (static out-of-workspace pre-allow `path → read|write|exec`; never prompts), `max_tool_result_chars`, `parallel_tools`, `confirm_destructive`, `path_denylist`, `max_context_tokens` (default 200k est. tokens). Truncated tool results carry a model hint (`[Truncated (N chars max; M omitted). You may ask for user to increase the limit via configuration file.]`) so the model can ask the user to raise `max_tool_result_chars`; request-time compact shrinks (`hint=False`) keep the terse `...[truncated N characters]` marker.
 
 ### Tools (`tools/`)
 
 Module-level `@tool` handlers. Call `set_workspace_root()` before use.
 
-- **`workspace`**: path resolve under primary root **or** temporary allowlist roots; path substring denylist; command basename denylist (CLI: timed human allow override, default deny on timeout; **not** skipped by YOLO); clearer deny messages.
+- **`workspace`**: path resolve under primary root **or** temporary allowlist roots **or** a directory-access grant (mode-aware: `read` < `write` < `exec`, default required `write`; a file grant matches only that file); path substring denylist (wins over grants); command basename denylist (CLI: timed human allow override, default deny on timeout; **not** skipped by YOLO); escape error hints `request_directory_access`.
+- **`access`** (`tools/access.py`): `request_directory_access` (LOCAL|INSTANCE|SESSION) asks the host hook for out-of-workspace access; grants are one `path → mode` pair in one of three stores — `WorkspacePolicy.config_allow` (static `[agent].allow_paths`), `SessionState.access_grants` (human-approved, persisted on the session row), `WorkspacePolicy.yolo_allow` (`--yes`/`/yolo`, process only). `AccessDecision(mode, persist)` from the hook; denylisted paths can never be granted; cap `MAX_ACCESS_GRANTS`. Not a sandbox: `exec` grants (and any command) reach the whole FS.
 - **`file`**: `read_file` (`with_lineno`, `max_chars` default 32k; results start with a 1-based `L{begin}-{end}` range), `write_file`, `listdir`, `tree` (model picks `format=markdown` default / `flat` paths / `decorated`; VCS + default noise dirs + optional `skip_dirs` / denylist walk), `glob_paths`, `grep_files` (regex, skip VCS/binary), `edit_replace` (`max_replaces`, reports remaining matches), `edit_lineno` (1-based range; only lines read via `with_lineno`; read state resets on any file write/edit/copy/move/delete), `copy_path` / `move_path` / `delete_path`, `new_temporary_workspace` (system temp allowlist; cleanup on chat exit; no session rebind), `get_truncated` (resume any truncated result via its `truncate_token=...`).
 - **`process`**: `run_argv` (argv, no shell, timeout, optional stdin/env); `run_argv_batch` (serial steps, `pipe_out` on provider, `mix_stderr`, `stop_on_error`); PTY `open_pty` / `read_pty` / `write_pty` (literal) / `write_pty_keys` (escapes) / `ask_into_pty` (human→PTY only; `secret` no-echo; answer never in tool result) / `close_pty` (POSIX: `pty`+`fork`; Windows: ConPTY via `pywinpty` env marker dep).
 - PTY: backend in `pty_backend.py`; structured status (`alive`/`exit_code`/`data`); `read_pty(..., until=)` (**CSI sanitized** so host TTY is never reset); keys via `write_pty_keys` only (`\xHH`, `ctrl+x`, `key=esc`); secrets via `ask_into_pty` (not `write_pty` data); session limit/idle TTL/output budget; close terminate→kill.
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ Module-level `@tool` handlers. Call `set_workspace_root()` before use.
 - **`todo`**: LIFO stack of **task groups** (not a queue of tasks) — `todo_push` creates one group of siblings; `todo_pop` removes the whole top group; `todo_update` by id; DFS breakdown push[T1,T2]→push[T1.1…]→pop→push[T2.1…]; stored on session row; open items = unfinished work (`[TODO OPEN WORK]`); all-terminal non-empty = hygiene (`[TODO HYGIENE]`); nag channel via `[agent] todo_nag_strategy` (`developer`/`user` = prose nag; `synthetic_tool` = forged `todo_list` call + **real** `stack.render()` result + ToolCall/Result events; `none`).
 - **`net` / `fetch`**: HTTP GET/POST/PUT/DELETE via niquests (isolated session, not the LLM client). Manual redirects with per-hop SSRF checks (`asyncio` `getaddrinfo`). Private/loopback hosts need instance policy grant (CLI timed confirm; **not** YOLO). Public cleartext HTTP and mutating methods soft-confirm (`YOLO`/`TRUSTABLE`). HTTPS→HTTP redirects blocked unless `allow_http_downgrade`. `user_agent` tool arg (or headers) is never replaced by the default when provided. Caps: body bytes/chars, request body size.
 - **`mcp`** (`tools/mcp.py`): register one server's advertised tools into the catalog as namespaced `mcp__<server>__<tool>` definitions with `ToolSource(kind="mcp", plugin_id=server)`; tags LOCAL (+ READ_ONLY when the server config sets `read_only`) — never YOLO/TRUSTABLE. `register_mcp_tools` purges prior MCP entries then re-registers every connected server (hosts call it on tool-registry rebuild); connections must already be started by `McpManager`.
-- **`DEFAULT_TOOLS` / catalog**: file + process + vcs + chat + todo + net (`fetch`) for local surface. `ToolTag.READ_ONLY` marks non-mutating tools (`read_file`, `get_truncated`, `listdir`, `glob_paths`, `grep_files`, `tree`, `todo_list`, `wait`, `ask_user_*`, `vcs_*`, `fetch`); `ToolRegistry.clone(read_only_only=True)` selects just those for safe side turns / planning, and `read_only_context()` (in `tools/context.py`) makes `fetch` accept GET only.
+- **`DEFAULT_TOOLS` / catalog**: access + file + process + vcs + chat + todo + net (`fetch`) for local surface. `ToolTag.READ_ONLY` marks non-mutating tools (`read_file`, `get_truncated`, `listdir`, `glob_paths`, `grep_files`, `tree`, `todo_list`, `wait`, `ask_user_*`, `vcs_*`, `fetch`); `ToolRegistry.clone(read_only_only=True)` selects just those for safe side turns / planning, and `read_only_context()` (in `tools/context.py`) makes `fetch` accept GET only.
 
 ### Prompting (`prompting.py`)
 
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ Shared interactive I/O: `ask` / `choose` / `form` / `confirm` with pluggable bac
 Click app + readline REPL. Entry: `plyngent` / `python -m plyngent`.
 
 - **`plyngent chat`**: provider/model (flags or interactive; Tab via readline in `prompting`); sessions store `provider_name`/`model` and restore on resume; SQLite via `[database]` (file DB under user data when url unset; explicit `url = ":memory:"` kept + warn); workspace-bound; resume latest for cwd/`--workspace` by default (`--new` / `--session`). One-shot: `-p/--prompt` and non-TTY stdin; exit codes 0/1/2/3; `--yes` (YOLO on), `--stream/--no-stream`, `--quiet`. Root `--log-level`. Enabled `[mcp]` servers start before the REPL (`_start_mcp_manager`, per-server failures warn on stderr) and are closed on exit (`McpManager.aclose`).
-- Slash: Click group in `cli/slash.py` + `awaitlet` for async work; Tab completer from registry + ParamType `shell_complete`. Multiline `"""` … `"""`; `/edit` via `$VISUAL`/`$EDITOR` (blocking only). `/yolo on|off|once` for soft destructive confirms. `/model --persist` / `/models --persist` write model catalog entries into TOML. `/todos` for human show/push/pop/clear of the todo stack. `/mcp` (`list` default) prints per-server status/tool counts + an `instructions` preview when the server sent usage guidance, + last stderr lines; `/mcp reconnect` re-reads config, restarts every enabled server, and rebuilds the tool registry.
+- Slash: Click group in `cli/slash.py` + `awaitlet` for async work; Tab completer from registry + ParamType `shell_complete`. Multiline `"""` … `"""`; `/edit` via `$VISUAL`/`$EDITOR` (blocking only). `/yolo on|off|once` for soft destructive confirms. `/model --persist` / `/models --persist` write model catalog entries into TOML. `/todos` for human show/push/pop/clear of the todo stack. `/mcp` (`list` default) prints per-server status/tool counts + an `instructions` preview when the server sent usage guidance, + last stderr lines; `/mcp reconnect` re-reads config, restarts every enabled server, and rebuilds the tool registry. `/grants` lists directory-access grants (`revoke <index|all>`; config grants point at the TOML); `/status` includes the grant count.
 - `/btw` side questions: forked session; main transcript/DB untouched. `--tools=read` (default) exposes only `READ_ONLY` tools under `read_only_context()` (fetch=GET) with the main session view; `--tools=no` off; `--tools=full` whole-registry clone with fresh session. Tools off: default falls back to no tools; explicit `read`/`full` errors.
 - Explicit `/resume` or `--session` from another workspace prompts: **keep** / **update** / **abort**.
 - Failed/cancelled turns: user kept; **committed tool rounds kept** (side effects not re-run on `/retry`); only unfinished assistant rolled back; Ctrl+C cancels; TTY confirms off-loop; auto-retry 10s/20s/30s then `/retry`.

README.md

@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ max_context_tokens = 200000
 # Fold MCP server initialize ``instructions`` (usage guidance) into the
 # system prompt when tools are on (default true; false ignores server text).
 # mcp_instructions = true
+# Static out-of-workspace pre-allow (path → read|write|exec); never prompts.
+# allow_paths = { "/data/datasets" = "read", "/tmp/build" = "exec" }
 
 # Optional plugins (entry-point names); default load none. See doc/plugins.md.
 # [plugins]
@@ -263,6 +265,7 @@ Type `/help` in the REPL for the live list. Common ones:
 | `/models` | List config + remote `GET /models` (always re-fetches) |
 | `/models --persist` | Merge remote catalog into TOML for this provider |
 | `/todos` | Todo/task stack: list, push, pop, done, clear |
+| `/grants` | Directory-access grants: list, or `revoke <index\|all>` |
 | `/config` | Edit `plyngent.toml` ($VISUAL/$EDITOR or system open); reload after blocking editor |
 | `/quit` | Leave the REPL |
 
@@ -272,15 +275,16 @@ User messages are saved immediately. On API error or Ctrl+C, partial assistant/t
 
 - **Workspace** = root for file/process/VCS tools (default cwd).
 - **Session** = SQLite chat bound to a workspace path.
+- Paths outside the workspace need a **directory-access grant**: the model calls `request_directory_access` (`read` / `write` / `exec`), the human approves at the requested level or another one (timed y/N, default deny; `--yes`/`/yolo` auto-approve as a process-only grant), and approval lasts for the session (`/grants` lists/revokes). Static pre-allow lives under `[agent].allow_paths`. The path denylist always wins, and grants gate path-resolving tools only — they are **not** a sandbox (`run_argv`/PTY reach the whole filesystem).
 - Resuming a session from another directory prompts: keep session workspace, rebind to current, or abort.
 
 ## Tools (when enabled)
 
-Default registry: file ops (including `tree` with a markdown bullet-list default, `flat` paths or classic `decorated` on demand; default noise-dir skips), `run_argv` / `run_argv_batch` / PTY (POSIX openpty; Windows ConPTY via pywinpty), read-only VCS (git), HTTP `fetch` (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE via niquests; private/loopback hosts need a human policy grant, not YOLO), human prompts (`ask_user_line` / `ask_user_choice` / `ask_user_form`), `wait` (line prompt with timeout; Enter disturbs), `get_truncated` (resume any truncated result via its `truncate_token=...`), and todo stack tools (`todo_list` / `todo_push` / `todo_pop` / `todo_update` / `todo_clear`).
+Default registry: file ops (including `tree` with a markdown bullet-list default, `flat` paths or classic `decorated` on demand; default noise-dir skips), `run_argv` / `run_argv_batch` / PTY (POSIX openpty; Windows ConPTY via pywinpty), read-only VCS (git), HTTP `fetch` (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE via niquests; private/loopback hosts need a human policy grant, not YOLO), human prompts (`ask_user_line` / `ask_user_choice` / `ask_user_form`), `wait` (line prompt with timeout; Enter disturbs), `request_directory_access` (out-of-workspace access grants), `get_truncated` (resume any truncated result via its `truncate_token=...`), and todo stack tools (`todo_list` / `todo_push` / `todo_pop` / `todo_update` / `todo_clear`).
 
 Safety defaults:
 
-- Paths stay under the workspace; optional `path_denylist` substrings (`tree` also skips denylisted children by default).
+- Paths stay under the workspace unless granted (`request_directory_access` / `[agent].allow_paths`); optional `path_denylist` substrings always apply (`tree` also skips denylisted children by default).
 - Command basename denylist (e.g. dangerous shells/utilities).
 - Destructive tools (delete/move/overwrite) can require confirm (`confirm_destructive`; default deny in non-TTY). Override for the session with `/yolo on|off|once` or startup `--yes` (path/command denylists still apply).
 - PTY sessions: caps, idle TTL, output budget; master FD is non-inheritable; sessions closed on chat exit.

doc/architecture.md

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
     - agent: Kind-based tool loop, streaming, usage, compact; bridges:
       ``responses_bridge``/``responses_dispatch``, ``messages_bridge``/``messages_dispatch``;
       ``@tool`` / tags / registry. History stays chat-completions-shaped.
-    - tools: Workspace file/process/VCS/chat/todo/net tools; catalog; plugins;
-      instance/session context and views.
+    - tools: Workspace file/process/VCS/chat/todo/net tools + directory-access
+      grants (`access`); catalog; plugins; instance/session context and views.
     - prompting: Shared ask/choose/form for CLI and tools.
     - cli: Click entry, slash registry, REPL, one-shot chat.
     - web: Web service (Phase H; not implemented).

doc/plyngent.example.toml

@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ max_tool_result_chars = 32000
 parallel_tools = true
 confirm_destructive = true
 path_denylist = ["/secrets/", ".ssh/", ".gnupg/"]
+# Static out-of-workspace pre-allow (path → read|write|exec); never prompts.
+# The model can also request access at runtime via request_directory_access
+# (human approves; /grants lists or revokes). Denylist still applies, and
+# grants are a tool-policy gate, not a sandbox (commands reach the FS).
+# allow_paths = { "/data/datasets" = "read", "/tmp/build" = "exec" }
 # Soft context budget in estimated tokens (~4 chars/token when API usage missing).
 max_context_tokens = 200000
 # Fold connected MCP servers' initialize ``instructions`` (usage guidance)