Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
NCBM 8c289db545 test: cover the far end of ssh
What the scan resolves (destination, options, jammed `-p2222`, mosh's `--`, a
hop behind `sudo`), what it leaves alone (a client with no command), and both
gates: `check_command_allowed` now refuses `ssh prod rm -rf /` and prompts for
the `sudo` behind the hop, while harmless remote commands stay allowed; the
review prints a remote `bash -c` code block and always asks under
`BatchMode=yes`.
2026-10-23 10:37:14 +08:00
NCBM 8ec63aa6a2 core/agent: let YOLO mode skip YOLO-tagged soft confirms
`--yes` / `/yolo on|off|once` clears the prompt of a `YOLO`-tagged tool: interpreter runs (`run_argv`, `run_argv_batch`, `open_pty`), the file mutations (overwrite / copy / move / delete) and `fetch_local`'s cleartext and mutating requests. A tool without the tag still asks, and hard path/command denylists stay untouched.

`classify_danger` now answers with a `DangerReason` — the reason text plus `yolo_skip` — so one call can refuse that skip: a command that runs through `sudo` / `su` / `doas` / `pkexec` (as the program or a wrapper) keeps its confirm whatever YOLO mode says. It never adds a reason of its own, so the program the denylist gate already asks about is not asked twice.

`prepare_batch_confirm` leaves the covered calls out, so a skipped call neither prompts on its own nor takes a slot in the round's aggregated prompt, and one escalating step keeps the whole batch in front of the human.
2026-10-21 19:10:46 +08:00
NCBM 135c28a622 core/tools: review a wrapper option that carries a command line
`env -S "rm -rf /"` ran a command nothing looked at: the option belongs to the
wrapper, so the scan skipped it and the denylist found no program to block while
the soft confirm had no interpreter to review. Collect those values — `env
-S`/`--split-string` and `su -c`/`--command`/`--session-command`, jammed
`--opt=value` and `-Svalue` forms included — and confirm the call the way an
interpreter's `-c` one-liner is confirmed, printing the text under its own
`env -S` label. Recursing into the text for a hard denylist is left out for now:
the review asks the human, who sees the command.
2026-10-06 21:54:18 +08:00
NCBM 2b3b2073a0 core/tools: only value-taking options may swallow the program
The wrapper option table listed flags as if they consumed the next token, so
the program behind them was skipped: `exec -c git -c init.defaultBranch=main
init` resolved to `init` and the policy denied it as a denylisted basename,
while `exec -c rm -rf /`, `command -p rm -rf /` and `command -v rm` hid `rm`
from the denylist completely and `exec -c python -c …` lost the interpreter
review. Drop the entries that take no value — `exec -c`/`-l`, the whole
`command` entry, `pkexec --disable-internal-agent`, `su -p`, and `xargs -e`
(its argument is optional, and the jammed form needs no entry) — so the
resolved program is the one that really runs.
2026-10-06 21:50:21 +08:00
NCBM 6453a8ac89 core/tools: resolve the program behind env wrappers and run launchers 2026-10-06 19:41:17 +08:00